Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-94-199 *14 October 1994*

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Effective 1 October, the processing indicators appearing in brackets at the start of each item in this publication will be changed. All new indicators will begin with "FBIS" to make the material more easily identifiable in databases. Some will also indicate whether the item has been translated from the vernacular or transcribed from English.

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Assembly Elects Yordanov SDS Faction Leader

AU1410094194 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 14 Oct 94

[Article by Zlatina Georogieva]

[FBIS Translated Text] The National Assembly is continuing its race against time. As Mariya Tsenkova reported a few minutes ago, Aleksandur Yordanov has been elected chairman of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS) parliamentary faction following Stefan Savov and 24 SDS deputies' departure from the faction. The SDS faction also decided to readmit those members who left the faction a while back. Several applications have already been submitted. The deputy chairmen of the faction have not been replaced.

It will be interesting to see whether the chairman of the National Assembly can also be the chairman of a parliamentary faction because this is unprecedented in parliamentary practice.

The National Assembly leadership is continuing its meeting in order to adopt today's agenda. Proposals have been made to hold sessions tomorrow and on 17 October.

Daily Views Limited Success of Privatization

MS1310100394 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 13 Oct 94 p 14

[Article by Anthony Robinson: "Plenty of Hurdles Remain"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bulgaria's mass privatisation programme (MPP), based on the Czech model using vouchers and private investment funds, suffered a severe blow before it even got off the ground when the rival privatisation agency took more than 35 most promising state companies in the MPP list for direct sale to foreign and domestic investors.

Legislation to set up the MPP was approved just before the government resigned, but Dimitur Stefanov, the executive director of the Centre for Mass Privatisation, admits that much technical work remains to be done before vouchers with a nominal value of 25,000 "investment Leva [Lv]" can be distributed to those willing to pay Lv500 for privatisation coupons. Even then a big effort will be required to arouse popular enthusiasm for the scheme.

In the meantime Renata Indzhova, the tough-minded executive director of the privatisation agency, is forging ahead with privatisation by direct sale to investors, a method which has already privatised 30 medium- to large-sized state-owned enterprises, of which the biggest and most recent is the $55m purchase by the German transport entrepreneur Willi Betz of a controlling 55 per cent stake in Somat, Europe's biggest trucking company.

The Somat deal, like most other deals to date, promises substantial future investment and job guarantees. But thus far the benefit to the Bulgarian treasury from privatisation has been limited. "Net revenues from privatisation to date are probably no more than $20m. But some $1.5bn in enterprise debt has been written off as a result of privatisation while the prospects for penetrating new markets and attracting further greenfield investment have improved," says Ms Indzhova.

Meanwhile the agency is hoping that the recent foreign debt reduction agreements, with their provision for debt/equity swaps, will stimulate the interest of foreign investors in state-owned assets with potential for growth once old debts are cleared and new management methods and equipment are installed.

Ms Indzhova is anxious to speed up the process as much as possible, largely because the negative effect of delay is only too obvious. Given the slowness of formal privatisation, Bulgarian state and municipal enterprises have been subjected to a wave of "hidden privatisation" which has alienated a large but unquantifyable amount of the choicest state or municipally-owned assets.

"It is impossible to calculate the loss accurately, but hidden privatisation reduces the net worth of enterprises and is reflected in rising inter-enterprise debt, the high level of debt to commercial banks, and ultimately adds to the budget deficit, driving inflation and crowding out the private sector," she says.

Such "hidden privatisation" usually involves the formation of private companies to supply state enterprises with inputs at high prices and other companies take their subsidised output for resale at market prices. In this way enterprises accumulate inter-company debts and losses while allowing a new class of millionaire "biznismen" to cream off economic rents.

The process of nationalising losses and privatising profits is widespread throughout the former Soviet bloc but has been most blatant in countries such as Bulgaria or Romania where the continuing influence of former communists, coupled with the weakness of the law and the inexperience of civil society has been most pronounced.

In Bulgaria's case what is popularly perceived as the "mafia-isation" of the economy has been further stimulated by the baleful side-effects of the UN embargo on trade with Serbia and the Greek embargo on trade with the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia.

Small but powerful groups of Serbs, Macedonians and Bulgarians have made quick fortunes by smuggling oil, weapons and a wide range of other commodities across the borders by a variety of ingenious methods which mostly include the bribing of police, customs and other officials at some stage.

"The war in former Yugoslavia has been a disaster for Bulgaria. I seriously doubt whether a country like the Czech republic would be so law-abiding if it had borders like ours," says Aleksandur Bozhkov, the former head of Bulgaria's privatisation agency who now runs a private consultancy firm specialising in assisting foreign investors.

Perhaps the most pernicious result of the widespread suspicion in which the new business class is held is the

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confirmation of many of the old communist propaganda images of rapacious capitalists grinding the faces of the poor and the "zero sum" notion that wealth is a stock rather than a flow so that one man's wealth is always at the expense of another.

Rising awareness of the dangers to future economic and social development of such widespread antipathy has spurred the more intelligent and genuinely entrepreneurial rather than parasitic, members of the "new class" to try and change both the image and the reality of private business ethics and methods.

This became clear last month when a split developed within the ranks of the G-13, a group of 13 leading private business groups, which has now been reduced to a rump G-9.

Lyubomir Gibinski, the prime mover behind Prime Investment Trust, a holding which controls 40 companies and is a major shareholder in TSBank, one of the largest and fastest growing private banks, led the breakaway.

"TSBank was a founder members of G-13 whose idea was to consolidate and strengthen national capital so that we could have a dialogue and proper partnership with foreign partners. But in practice some of the members interpreted this as a way of dividing up the market and to express their dislike of foreign investors," says Mr Gibinski.

They also had a tendency to use "non-market methods" he added, a euphemism to explain the rash of car bombs, shootouts and beatings which have punctuated Sofia street life in recent months. "We decided to leave G-13 as our principles are free enterprise and fair competition, a North American not Latin American style of business," he said.

Kozloduy Nuclear Plant's Fifth Reactor Restarted

AU1310145994 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 13 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The fifth reactor of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant, which was halted for a brief time, has been restarted, and today it reached 75 percent of its 1,000-megawatt capacity, reporter Veselin Angelov reports.

[Begin Angelov recording] The other 1,000-megawatt reactor, the sixth, is operating at 55 percent of its capacity because of the relatively warm weather.

The third reactor is undergoing planned repairs. The first and second reactors are operating at 95 percent of their capacity, while the fourth reactor is operating at 50 percent of its capacity.

The Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant now produces a total of 2,000 megawatt electric power, which is 20 percent of the total production of electric power in the country. The capacities will be fully utilized during the first colder days. [end recording]

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Communists Most Numerous in Local Elections

AU1410105594 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 6 Oct 94 p 3

[Article by Jiri Polak: "Of the Coalition Parties, the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party and the Civic Democratic Party Have the Largest Number of Lists of Candidates, Often Joint Ones"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Voters in approximately 4,200 out of the Czech Republic's total number of 6,232 communities will be able to cast their votes for Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia [KSCM] candidates. This ensues from data ascertained by HOSPODARSKE NOVINY. There are some 40,000 candidates running on KSCM lists. In a number of districts and also in Prague, the KSCM offers its candidates to a larger proportion of the electorate than in 1990. Some 2,100 lists of candidates are composed exclusively of KSCM members.

The Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL] has only preliminary data available, according to which the Christian Union is running in about 2,400 communities and offers some 20,000 candidates to the electorate. The Civic Democratic Party [ODS] has managed to compile 1,643 lists of candidates, on which over 20,000 citizens are running, about one-half of whom are ODS members. In 152 cases, the ODS is running in coalition, most often with the KDU-CSL (66).

In about 770 places, the electorate will have the opportunity to choose candidates of the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD]. Overall, more than 9,300 citizens throughout the Czech Republic are running for the CSSD. Approximately 40 percent of the candidates are CSSD members. In over 80 percent of the communities in which it is running, the CSSD has fielded separate lists of candidates; in cases in which it has formed coalitions, the most frequent are those with the Green Party, the Free Democrats (Civic Movement), and the Liberal Social Union.

The Liberal National Social Party [LSNS] is running in 500 places and offers 5,760 candidates to the electorate. In 330 cases, the LSNS managed to compile its own lists of candidates, and, in 170 cases, the Liberal Socialists concluded preelection coalitions. Most of them have been established with the ODS, the CSSD, the KDU-CSL, and the Party of Entrepreneurs, Tradesmen, and Farmers [SPZR]. (The LSNS and the SPZR have recently concluded an agreement of cooperation.) A total of 3,900 LSNS members are running in the elections.

The Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA] has compiled 280 lists of candidates and put forward 4,430 candidates, 1,800 of whom are ODA members. The ODA's most frequent coalitions are with the KDU-CSL, the ODS, and the Christian Democratic Party [KDS]. The SPZR has compiled about 200 lists of candidates. Most often, the SPZR has formed coalitions with the LSNS, the ODS, and the Club of Nonaligned Activists.

The smallest government party, the KDS, is running in 160 places and proposes some 1,800 candidates for the communal elections. Almost half of them are party members.

Accomplishments of Klaus Government Reviewed

94CH0423A Prague LISTY in Czech No 4, 1994 pp 3-7

[Article by Jaroslav Sabata: "At Halftime in the Klaus Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The fact that the Czech Republic remains "an island in a sea of peculiar reversions to undeniably leftist trends" is allegedly a tremendous success. This is how Vaclav Klaus saw things following the leftist victory in the Hungarian parliamentary elections held in May. His words not only reflected pride in the "Czech number-one team," which is stealing a march on everyone and is planning a small economic miracle, but also indicated some anxiety: "Are we doing enough," the prime minister is asking, "to see to it that our fragile stability is preserved as long as possible?"

Vaclav Klaus has many reasons to be nervous: At the moment when he has reached half-time in office, the stability of his government is truly somewhat fragile, and it would seem that he would be satisfied if its magnificent uniqueness would last as long as possible; it is as though he did not believe that it would endure until such time as the entire leftist-limping East started to move in the same direction. And so, with a pretension of certitude, he suggests to the public that, "without the ODS [Civic Democratic Party], the Czech Republic would be in the same fix as Hungary and Poland."

However, the ODS did not renew democracy in this country. The pre-November power structure had lost the ground beneath its feet as early as the time that Vaclav Havel was elected president and when governments of national understanding were established. At the time the governments of the Civic Forum, the Calfa as well as the Pithart governments, initiated the turnaround toward political democracy and a market economy, the ODS was still out picking mushrooms.

The desire of the Vaclav Klaus government, which was established following the elections of June 1992, to benefit from the actions of governments that preceded it is an undeniable priority. Strictly speaking, the move to the right could continue until it outstripped the influence of the most radical opponents of the "velvet...."

Therefore, the Klaus government must also be evaluated according to what it did not do: It did not plunge the revolution into anarchy and chaos and has a good conservative (in the better sense of the word) instinct. Its position on restitutions, on the anticommunist law, as well as in many another respect, was more circumspect than the position of the most vociferous portion of the parliamentary right. That is why, incidentally, its most disillusioned followers lost their nerve and began creating a truly rightist party.

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Vaclav Klaus was unable to repudiate the post-November achievements, even if he wanted to. Together with Vladimir Dlouhy, he significantly participated in the creation of the economic policy characteristics of the Calfa government from its very beginning. His government was thus sentenced to a certain amount of continuity with the former government. (It is quite another matter if one pretends that, after November, we had "only" the Vaclav Klaus government.)

However, without doubt, the Vaclav Klaus government can claim merit for one thing: It divided the state. In June 1992, even the most entrenched centralists understood that federal strength would not save Czechoslovakia. Moreover, the rightist parties fell victim to a small panic; their magnificent conservative island in the very heart of Europe appeared to be threatened by the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] of Meciar. But, at that time, the slogan "A peaceful parting of the ways" was already at hand, as was the man determined to see to its realization....

By dividing the state, the Klaus government radicalized the weakest side of the predecessor government—its inability to transform the Czechoslovak "federal totality" into a Czecho-Slovak democratic touchstone of Central European cooperation. Of course, the idea of a Czecho-Slovak union did present itself. But, like the remainder of the totality of post-November (foreign) policy, it was merely the fruit of inappropriate experimentation and meaningless megalomania.

The division of the state is perceived not only by the ODS, but also by many others as a positive, if not the most positive, component of the two-year government balance sheet. At the ODS congress at Koprivnice, Josef Zieleniec glorified this event as a heroic deed (let us add for purposes of completeness that a certain kind of heroism is also involved in acts of arson against churches). But many people got the feeling that we have become a state that is too small and substantially less secure. This feeling should be attenuated by the conviction in the tremendous success of transforming the Republic into a "small rightist island."

From the standpoint of long-range interests of the Czech state, everything is different. Nationalist pressures have weakened the European as well as the democratic orientation of the Czech state.

It is symptomatic that Vaclav Klaus compared the results of the Hungarian elections not only with Polish developments, but also with "recent developments in Slovakia." Accordingly, even the Slovak turnaround is categorized as more or less being a part of the unpropitious comebacks. In so doing, Vaclav Klaus magnanimously overlooked the fact that he placed the more nationalistic wing of the HZDS higher than the right-left government of Jozef Moravcik, which is gravitating toward democracy.

The separatist solution of the Czecho-Slovak crisis culminated in the formation of the Czech variation of "new nationalism"—which is a peculiar type of provincial nationalism—which is marching through Europe at the end of the 20th century. It is Vaclav Klaus rather than Jan Kalvoda who became the high priest of our new nationalism.

Each of these nationalisms is an expression of weakness on the part of democratic forces, an expression of the relative immaturity of the "postcommunist" political elites, their lack of suitability to establish and create an internally integrated and dynamically democratic state that would be responsive to the demands of the universalist prospects of our days.

Naturally, this handicap was already being combated by the post-November governments, and the Klaus government inherited a serious debt from them. But its own shortcomings are still more serious: The government coalition, even according to Deputy Prime Minister Jan Kalvoda, is suffering from "a loss of interest in reforming the public administration" (CESKY DENNIK, 11 June 1990). However, Jan Kalvoda speaks not about his party but, rather, about the ODS. Its proposal to "make a lot of regions out of the okreses" was even characterized by a famous publicist for MLADA FRONTA DNES (10 June 1994) as nonsense—the notion of having 75 regional lobbies arguing with each other is reported to be downright appalling (Petr Novacek)—and another publicist characterized it as a manifestation of the chaos within the ODS, which is downright conspicuous (Jiri Leschtina).

The expressiveness of the publicists tends to dramatize the disputes. But the disputes that are surfacing in connection with attempts to reform public administration and to solve the omnipresent problem of the bureaucratization of the executive power are obvious. For a change, the chief of the government tends to make light of them. He confides that he is uncomfortable with the "parkinsonian acts of bureaucratism" (one can imagine what he is going through if he thinks about the runaway spread of the so-called ministerial decentralized facilities or of the truly poor efficiency and irresponsible nature of some of his colleagues in the government), but he "truly does not have a feeling that there is a backlog" in the fulfillment of some of the points of the government declaration (LIDOVE NOVINY, 10 June 1994).

The chaos within the ODS is blending with the weakening cohesion of the entire government coalition and, by the way, also with the tension between the prime minister and the president. It is certainly not surprising that, within the government, voices speaking for notions and interests of various political forces active on the soil of the government majority are constantly striving to be heard more. This is as natural as the effort to prolong, to the maximum point possible, the stressing of the fact that the government coalition has not found itself at the freezing point, that it is not undergoing a crisis, that the disputes regarding the "evergreens" (the senate, public administration, restitutions) involve only efforts by the

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individual parties to become "more visible," and so forth. The instinct for political self-preservation is powerful: Of course, the government coalition is aware that it is standing at the brink of a precipice as a result of its weak majority in parliament....

This is, so to speak, the surface of things. However, it is indicative of various things. The majority of the public continues to have a relatively positive attitude toward the government. The argument that the koruna is firm, that inflation is tolerable, and that unemployment is miraculously low is valid. At the same time, however, there is growing unsettlement and dissatisfaction with the status of things in general. Many are beginning to realize that the scandals involving the misuse of public office, of corruption, of swindling and pilfering public property can no longer be explained away by the soothing and flashy statements by the prime minister regarding "traffic accidents" (along the reliably charted road to the future). The pontifical nature of the government bureaucracy, accustomed as it was to bureaucratic practices and a virtually authoritarian work style, and intervening on a daily basis in affairs of corruption, has a "natural" counterpart in the conduct of certain parts of the political elite, which has become partly gentrified and partly, as someone at one time noted at the periphery of the disputes regarding the law on the conflict of interest, has become downright "populist." The growth of general and particularly of organized crime compels the conclusion that it is impossible to become reconciled with crime as the inevitable tax paid for freedom. And we could continue.

The turnaround in the moods and thinking of ordinary people and the impact upon the more and more brittle political structure of the government are obviously noted by the prime minister. But what is he to do? He cannot develop a true strategy for the social control of the "political class" on the basis of his assumptions regarding how one governs or how one attenuates the harmful bureaucratic pressures of all types, and how to overcome the corrupting pressures of capitalism. Although he speaks of decentralization, everything that strengthens the opposite trend is happening: a tendency to strengthen state administration and to weaken self-administration, to restrict the influence of the trade unions, to mistrust "civic society," to choke off everything that is even remotely reminiscent of the threat of Czech-Moravian dualism, but even any kind of more systematic supra-border collaboration. These are all expressions of one and the same striving to centralize power, toward an inclination to keep this citizen "on a short rein."

Not even Vaclav Klaus's party is what it was when it split off from Civic Forum. A spirit of a would-be sovereign coalition of its kind is abroad in the party, the analysis of which still awaits us.

When this neuralgic point was touched upon by the deputy chairman of ODA [Civic Democratic Alliance], Daniel Kroupa, the prime minister glowed until he was white-hot. The notion that the ODS has changed and that its goals have shifted was said to be egregious, and he was "not willing to listen any further" (television debate on 12 June 1994). As is well known, we are most angry about a truth against which we are powerless....

Daniel Kroupa, perhaps involuntarily, found an important common denominator for all manifestations of loss of pace, which can be noted on the vast field of the democratic transformation: The fact is that the ODS has become opportunistic and is beginning to govern at the expense of the future without any great scruples.

The policy of deferring radical solutions for inefficient management at many state enterprises is prolonging the life for destructive tendencies that are part of preprivatization agonies (artificial delays of bankruptcies are only one of the manifestations of this complex of problems) and also the inability of the government to extricate itself from the policy of the foolish destruction of cooperatives—from a policy of chaotic property relationships in rural areas, ignoring the stagnation of investments in land and machinery, as well as from the illusions of cheap foodstuffs through imports. Added to this is the overlooking of the interests of small businessmen, a rigid fiscal policy, concessions to various types of monopolizing tendencies, the ignoring of the negative aspects of coupon privatization, the absence of a clear concept for foreign investments as well as foreign trade, a totally neglected housing policy....

The list of critical reservations regarding the government's social policies, beginning with education and health care, culture and science, through youth problems, the problems of young families, retirees, and women, all the way to everyday security for citizens and the environment, does not end with these. We hear that it is, of course, only possible to spend as much as we have. This seemingly strong argument, however, circumvents the very essence of political questioning, the question of whether the government is creating the necessary resources through its policies or whether it is not, in contrast, undermining them as a result of its planning and strategies based on its policies.

As a result of its relative civilizing headstart, the Czech Republic has at its disposal incomparably greater reserves of all types than do its eastern neighbors. And, in view of the fortuitous "tapping" [of the furnace] that was used to radically implement the peaceful revolution, it is essentially a politically stable country.

Vaclav Klaus and his associates are transforming this historical advantage into "splendid isolation" Czech-style, but not to the benefit of matters Czech. Not even in Central Europe does democratic political culture come into being on the basis of a mere change of regime. Even the Czech stumbling on the road to new democracy is among the inevitable staggering that occurs on every new road. However, in the long term it is not tragic because we catch a glimpse of the tragedy in the disintegration of the state.

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"The new democratic" direction is struggling to the forefront with problems—how else?—but is becoming crystallized in a constantly clearer manner. The victory of the Polish left in September of last year dispelled the illusions that postcommunist Europe is moving inexorably to the right. The victory of the Horn leftist party in Hungary tends to strengthen the Polish experience, indicating that turning away from a rightist course does not signify a return to an authoritarian regime, that it is not just stumbling on the road to democracy but can be a return to it after a detour.

Security Aspects of Oil Privatization Debated

LD1310214894 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1100 GMT 13 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] [Czech radio correspondent] Ilona Dienstbierova selected the following information for you from the parliamentary committees' sessions today:

[Dienstbierova] This morning, the Defense and Security Committee discussed security aspects of the privatization of the petrochemical industry. Ministers Jan Ruml and Vladimir Dlouhy answered the deputies' questions and observations.

Some deputies praised Minister Ruml's position on the situation in Chemapol and the fact that he drew attention to the interests of the Russian mafia. But it is not only in the Czech Republic where Russian and Ukrainian oil companies would like to gain control over capital.

Minister Dlouhy also explained the need to complete the construction of the Ingolstadt oil pipeline. He said current oil stocks will last about 20 days. One of the reasons is that there are not enough oil storage reservoirs.

Jan Ruml mentioned cooperation with the intelligence services that are active on our territory. The Security Intelligence Service submitted its own report to the government. But the minister did not discuss this report with the deputies today. He discussed with them measures of how to prevent, in the petrochemical industry, too, the penetration of organized crime from abroad.

At the end of the session, the deputies asked for more detailed information about the course of action the government will take if, for any reason, oil stocks are markedly reduced. They will submit this request in writing to Economy Minister Karel Dyba.

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Envoy Comments on U.S. Brown Amendment

AU1310172294 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 12 Oct 94 p 1

[TA SR report: "Slovakia Can Also Have Standard NATO Equipment"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Washington—"I think it is extremely positive that Slovakia has been included in the group of Central European states in the Brown-Simonov Amendment. This is a sign that both the U.S. Congress and the Administration are prepared to accept favorable reports about Slovakia and to make appropriate use of them in formulating their policy toward our Republic," Branislav Lichardus, ambassador to the United States, said to a TA SR correspondent.

The ambassador also emphasized that Slovakia was included in this amendment on the basis of the efforts made among Congress officials by the embassy and the Slovak expatriate community.

The Brown-Simonov Amendment authorizes the U.S. Administration to provide Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic with equipment and supplies that will help these countries to standardize their equipment with that of the NATO countries. Slovakia had not been mentioned in the previous Congressional resolutions, debates, and discussions of this amendment.

Survey Views Attitudes on Security, NATO

AU1210212394 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 7 Oct 94 p 3

[Unattributed report: "What the Survey on Slovak Republic Citizens' Attitude Toward State Defense and Security Reveals"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If a referendum on the entry of the Slovak Republic [SR] into NATO were held in Slovakia, almost one-half of the population would be in favor of joining, and only 18.4 percent would be opposed. This transpires from a public opinion survey that was organized jointly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Slovak Radio's Methodological Research Department in July, using a representative sample of 1,262 citizens of Slovakia. One-third of those polled gave a third reply, one they would not be able to give in a referendum on whether they are in favor of the SR's joining NATO—namely, "I do not know." Compared with last year, the number of advocates of the SR's NATO membership increased slightly.

The following table registers the results:

	1994	1993
	Percent	
In favor	48.4	44.7
Against	18.4	20.2
Do not know	33.2	35.1

Asked about their view of the Partnership for Peace [PFP] program, the greatest part of respondents replied that it considers it a certain compromise, which reacts to the interest of the countries of Central and East Europe in security guarantees. More than one-half of those polled (51.1 percent) termed the SR's participation in PFP "needed" or "much needed" from the viewpoint of enhancing our security. The opposite view—namely, that our participation is scarcely needed or not needed at all—was endorsed by only 14.6 percent.

Overall, the survey confirmed that respondents assess the security environment in Central Europe very positively. It showed that SR citizens do not harbor extraordinary fears of an external threat to the state. During last year's survey, when a similar question was used, one, however, that was formulated in the context of the whole of Europe, diametrically different views were ascertained, revealing people's much greater fear of war. The most recent survey thus indicates that the Slovak public regards the area of Central Europe as more stable than some other parts of our continent.

The respondents showed a slight preference for the SR's security orientation toward integration into West European security structures over the neutrality of our state. No tendency manifests itself at present in any sociodemographic group of our population that would seek guarantees for our national security in the direction of Russia. Such an orientation of security policy was supported by only 3.2 percent of those questioned.

It is possible to assume, on the basis of the survey's findings, that a relatively strong group of the population with clearly defined views has crystallized in the Slovak public and clearly associates the SR's security orientation with integration into West European security structures. Support for such a policy is biggest among university and secondary school graduates, among people of working age, among entrepreneurs, and, in part, among employees under age 49.

Respondents evaluated NATO overwhelmingly as a factor guaranteeing security in present-day Europe. More than one-half of those polled said that this organization's prospects for guaranteeing European security will remain the same or will grow. The public considers important the provision of information on the importance of NATO activities for the SR's security. As regards our preparedness

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to join NATO, the respondents' assessment was somewhat critical. Almost 20 percent of those polled believe that Slovakia is less prepared for this step than the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary.

The following tables register some results of the survey in percentages.

How should the SR proceed, in your opinion, to guarantee its security?	
The SR should join military-political alliances such as NATO or the Western European Union [WEU]	27.0
The SR should become neutral	25.1
The SR should conclude bilateral treaties with neighboring states or the great powers	19.2
The SR should participate in the formation of a completely new security system on the European Continent	12.8
The SR should participate in the formation of a military-political alliance of Slavic states headed by Russia	3.2
Do not know	7.9
Take no interest in this issue	4.8

What is your view of the importance of NATO for security in present-day Europe?	
NATO is at present the sole organization capable of guaranteeing peace in Europe	7.1
NATO is the most important of the organizations ensuring peace in Europe, but it must cooperate with other organizations active in the security sphere	23.9
NATO is of the same importance to European security as other organizations active in this sphere (UN, CSCE, WEU)	23.9
NATO predominantly pursues its own interests and pays little heed to European security under the changed conditions	13.5
NATO's activity is a relic of the past; it can influence the situation only when it itself changes	8.9
Do not know	11.6
Take no interest in this issue	11.3

How prepared to join NATO is the SR, in your opinion, compared with other countries seeking membership (particularly the Czech Republic, the Hungarian Republic, and Poland)?	
More prepared	5.1
Prepared equally	45.4
Less prepared	19.3
Do not know	19.2
Take no interest in this issue	11.1

How do you think NATO will approach the SR's admission?	
The SR will be admitted at the same time as other Central European countries seeking membership	37.3
The SR will be admitted earlier than other Central European countries seeking membership	4.5
The SR will be admitted later than other Central European countries seeking membership	25.4
The SR will not be admitted at all	6.3
Do not know	17.6
Take no interest in this issue	9.0

HZDS, Berlusconi's Forza Italia in 'Accord'

AU1410112894 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 12 Oct 94 p 3

[Interview with HZDS Press Spokesman Dusan Kleiman and Italian Forza Italia "representative" Karim Mezran by Sona Vrbjarova and Peter Skorna; place and date not given: "Dr. Berlusconi Sent Greetings to Dr. Vladimir Meciar"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to a TA SR report of 10 October 1994, Italian President Oscar Luigi Scalfaro will be one of the first foreign politicians to visit post-election Slovakia. The public knows about Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] contacts with the winner of the Italian election, Forza Italia. For this reason, we put a few questions to HZDS Press Spokesman Dusan Kleiman and Karim Mezran, representative of the Italian ruling party Forza Italia's Foreign Relations Department.

Before the start of the election campaign, a representative of the victorious party Forza Italia gave a lecture to the HZDS, and even the HZDS campaign slogan "Go Slovakia, go" was based on Forza Italia's model.

[SLOVENSKY DENNIK] Do you still maintain contact with the Italian party and, if so, at what level?

[Kleiman] Before the election, we had only one meeting with Mr. Molinaro, a representative of Mr. Berlusconi's party, at which he passed on his experience of the conduct of the election campaign and the manner of its organization. After the meeting, he had dinner with Mr. Meciar, at which he communicated to him Forza Italia's interest in mutual political contacts. That was all, for the time being. I would be misleading you if I said that some agreement had been reached or that no agreement had been reached.

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[Mezran] The contacts we have with the HZDS are, for the time being, at the level of personal meetings between one of our deputies, Mr. Molinaro, and HZDS leader Meciar. Deputy Molinaro has visited Slovakia and met with Mr. Meciar in an atmosphere of mutual sympathy and understanding.

[SLOVENSKY DENNIK] Have you contacted Mr. Molinaro or Forza Italia since that dinner?

[Kleiman] That is hard to say. I have not been informed about any contacts. I know that Mr. Meciar had dinner with Mr. Molinaro, who gave him a message and greetings from Mr. Berlusconi. I also know that interest in mutual contacts was expressed because Forza Italia, like the HZDS, is a party of a new type that has no international contacts and is searching for them. The possibility of political and programmatic proximity was stated....

[SLOVENSKY DENNIK] Italian President Oscar Luigi Scalfaro is to visit Slovakia before the end of November. Is the HZDS preparing for this visit in any specific way? And will Forza Italia representatives be part of the delegation?

[Kleiman] This question has not yet been discussed within the HZDS. Coalition talks were the main topic on the agenda of the last meeting of the HZDS Political Board.

[Mezran] Representatives of our movement will not be coming to Slovakia with President Scalfaro. It will be an official government visit. Our relations with the HZDS must be understood as relations between partners, which is also why our possible future meetings will initially take place at the level of unofficial partnership talks.

[SLOVENSKY DENNIK] How do you assess the HZDS election victory?

[Mezran] It fills us with great joy, and not just because we are greatly impressed by the HZDS leader. Mr. Meciar is extremely knowledgeable about the Forza Italia movement, Dr. Berlusconi's election victory, the organization of our party, and the methods by which a party can reap great success in general.

Moreover, there is an evident ideological accord between our two parties. That is why we always take delight in any contact with the HZDS, which was so successful among the voters.

Moravcik Accused of Divulging Workers' Demands

AU1410104594 Bratislava SME in Slovak 12 Oct 94 p 1

[Article by "(r)": "Association of Workers of Slovakia Chairman Jan Luptak Is Mistaken"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"I am sorry that these points (the conditions set by the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] for the political parties—editor's note) were made public. We had thought that none of the political entities would reveal them; unfortunately, one of them has. There are 13 of these points, not 12. There were 12 on the document we gave to one person, so we know who divulged them; it is not a secret," said Jan Luptak to Radiozurnal yesterday. He was talking about the ZRS's demands, which SME published on 8 October. In reply to a question from Radiozurnal on who, in his opinion, released the document, the ZRS chairman said: "The only person we gave the document with the 12 points to was Mr. Moravcik. No one else could have received it because only I had a copy of it. The next day I added a handwritten 13th point. It could only have come from Mr. Moravcik, not from anyone else."

The Editorial Office's point of view: Mr. Luptak is mistaken. SME got the material from another source. It is important to us that no one has cast doubt on the 12 points. Why the ZRS chairman added a 13th point the next day in his own handwriting is his business. We have not managed to find out if the Democratic Union and other entities were also informed of this point, but it is true that Peter Weiss, chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left, spoke about 13 points as early as on 7 October. We reported this fact on the same page as the aforementioned 12 points.

Search for Consensus Within Hungarian Coalition

94CH0434A Bratislava MOSTY in Slovak 13 Sep 94 p 9

[Commentary by Eleonora Sandor: "A Minority Within a Minority"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hungarian political parties in Slovakia must come to terms with two equally important and demanding tasks: to obtain delegate mandates and not to suppress the ideological plurality of the community on which they rely for support. To what extent is the solution of these tasks aided by the triple coalition agreement on cooperation?

The results of public opinion polls indicate that the first goal will be achieved without any problems. The expansion of the proven tandem of the Coexistence Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement [MKDH] by the addition of the Hungarian Civic Party [MOS] will further increase the number of "Hungarian" seats in parliament. It is true that, in view of the fact that candidates of MOS appear on election lists, it is questionable whether the triple coalition will be only a preelection one. However, it is difficult to be opposed to the statement made by Pal Csaky (MKDH) when he says that politics is not a charity. While the sequence in which the candidates are listed perhaps does not correspond to the amount of support the listed parties may have in the south of Slovakia, it most certainly and accurately reflects their starting negotiating positions.

Thus, parliamentary representation is assured. Matters are worse when it comes to guaranteeing the possibility

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to express the ideological plurality of the voters, as well as of the coalition parties themselves. Under the threat of strict sanctions, the coalition agreement prohibits any kind of independent speeches or independent negotiations by both the parties and the individual delegates. A sentence in the introduction to the agreement is scornful of the period 1990-92, when delegates of the MKDH, on the one hand, and those of MOS (MNI [Independent Hungarian Initiative]), on the other, made no secrets of their differing approaches to problems, even in parliament, and indicates that this period was harmful to Hungarians. This sentence allows one to sense that the goal of the prescribed strict parliamentary faction discipline is not to follow with some kind of political science lesson but, rather, an effort to present one unified view that is considered to be the only correct one. Decisions within the parliamentary faction will be the result of voting. In other words, they will be the views of the strongest entities.

Theoretically, Miklos Duray is undoubtedly correct when he speaks of the fact that, in developed democracies, preelection coalitions are, at best, an unaccustomed manifestation. Politicians who hold similar views come together in a single party. Politicians with differing views create independent parties, and, in any event, they set about having the attractiveness of their own views verified by the voters during elections and make no attempt to "smuggle themselves" into parliament on the candidate lists of major parties, subsequently forming independent factions and thus destabilizing parliament. The Hungarian parties are far from ready for fusion—to enter the elections given the existence of the 5-percent clause would be nonsense. But the formation of a coalition, in which heterogeneousness will be absolutely suppressed, however, has remained as the only possibility. This approach, which we could consider to be praiseworthy with respect to every "Slovak" coalition, signifies the end of any kind of plurality in the case of the Hungarian parties. That is because there is no other extracoalition Hungarian political entity.

The voice of the minority within the minority has been silenced—for the time being, only in terms of politics.

Tajik Prime Minister's Visit Said Unofficial

LD1310211094 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 2030 GMT 13 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued a statement concerning the current visit by Tajik Prime Minister Abdulmadjid Samadov to Slovakia. The statement stresses that Samadov is paying a private business visit and that the ministry has no links to the visit. According to the statement, the visit was initiated by the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia.

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Foreign Minister Reacts to Recent Criticism

AU1410113594 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 13 Oct 94 p 3

[Unattributed article: "We Cannot Sign a Bad Basic Treaty"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the meeting of the parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee held on 12 October, Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs reacted to the criticism of Hungarian foreign policy by the opposition. Mentioning a statement made by Gyorgy Csoti, deputy chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and parliamentary deputy of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], according to which the Horn government's foreign policy is a "comedy of errors" and "useless smiling diplomacy," Laszlo Kovacs pointed out that this opinion is not at all in harmony with the evaluations of the 22 foreign ministers with whom he held talks in recent months. Kovacs repeatedly pointed out that the three foreign policy priorities are equal in status, closely connected to each other, and interdependent. He only focused on the need to improve relations with our neighbors in one of his recent statements because the government regards this as an extremely urgent task. Kovacs rejected the criticism that it is useless to stress that our European integration is unimaginable without improving our relations with the neighboring countries, primarily Romania and Slovakia, because, as Kovacs put it, whether we say it or not, we can only become EU members after we achieve this. However, Kovacs agreed that we should not sign a bad basic treaty under any circumstances, but, as he put it, we were not the ones to bring up the need for a basic treaty. The need for such treaties emerged in our relations with Romania and Slovakia, but, for example, together with the Czech foreign minister, they came to the conclusion that there is no need for a basic treaty between the two countries. At the same time, Kovacs made it clear that the Hungarian Government does not believe that relations cannot be settled without a basic treaty. "We will not sign any basic treaty that contradicts our interests," Kovacs promised and added that everything the Hungarian Government said about the border issue does not exceed the stipulations of the Helsinki Final Document. Kovacs denied the existence of an alleged euphoria in government circles in connection with improving relations with our neighbors. In this connection, Kovacs reminded his audience that the government promised only quick action and not quick results, and Gyula Horn's visit in Bratislava and Teodor Melescanu's visit in Budapest took place in this framework. In this respect, it makes a difference that the ball is now in the Slovak and the Romanian field, respectively.

As for our relations with NATO, Kovacs said that our role is only to stress that we are ready to become NATO members, and, in addition, our only task is to prepare for this membership.

At the meeting, a strong debate, occasionally including personal remarks, took place among the government representatives and the opposition. However, all of the people present in the meeting agreed that it was very useful to invite the foreign minister, and this practice should continue.

Finance Minister Outlines 1995 Indicators

AU1110191694 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 11 Oct 94 p 11

[Article by Katalin Bossanyi: "Forecast for Foreign Investors"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Finance Minister Laszlo Bekesi held a briefing for Swiss businessmen on 10 October. Bekesi outlined the 1995 prospects, mainly from the point of view of foreign investors. It was remarkable that, among the key figures of the 1995 budget, talking about the budget deficit, he mentioned 5 percent of the GDP as a governmental goal that can be achieved, as is specified by the IMF, as opposed to the previous level of 7 percent of the GDP. He estimated the balance of payments deficit at approximately $2 billion, with the proviso that the import of working capital is also expected to be at least as high as this. He indicated that this year's 2-to-3-percent growth will remain on the level of the economic performance in 1995, while significant balance improvement measures will be implemented in the economy. He estimated the export growth at 6-7 percent, import growth at 4 percent, and inflation at 20 percent, while the increase of gross wages cannot exceed 14-15 percent and unemployment will be about 11-12 percent. As a result of the strict budgetary and structural reforms, an annual 3-4 percent lasting growth is forecast from 1997 onwards, Bekesi said.

He called attention to the fact that, in the course of stabilizing the economy, they wish to make the arena for enterprises more predictable for foreign and domestic investors. For this reason, the income type taxes will be gradually decreased—also including that on profit revenues—and the consumption type taxes increased. From the beginning of 1995, more measures that stimulate savings and investments will come into force. Among other things, the individual assessment of investment advantages for foreigners will be abolished, and a unified investment code that gives preferences according to the size of the capital investment will replace it. He specially mentioned infrastructural developments and that international financial organizations and banking groups as consortiums have indicated their interest in financing these. Analyzing the new privatization strategy, he called attention to the changed ownership of banks and public utilities involving cash or increased capital.

The Swiss businessmen were mostly interested in the privatization opportunities, especially in the energy sector. Answering questions, the finance minister expounded that the bill containing the new privatization strategy that will be submitted to parliament before the end of October will have two elements: the law on property, and the provisions on the new privatization organization and the rules of changing ownership. Because of the discussions, parliament will probably only accept the law at the end of November, and the new organization will be set up on 1 December. However, privatization will not be halted in the meantime, Bekesi

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emphasized. As for the energy sector, the one-step price increase to be implemented early next year will be an important step toward the change of ownership. However, even preceding this, the ground will be prepared for favorable investments. The inspection of the affected companies—mainly the MVM RT. [Hungarian Electricity Works Inc.], the MOL RT. [Hungarian Oil and Gas Inc.], and the gas supply network—is nearing an end. According to the recommendations, the enterprises will be transformed and decentralized as early as November, and the invitation for new bids will be published in December. The basic concept includes finding majority investors who are expert in the area, ending the state's majority ownership, and carrying out the privatization by increasing the capital in addition to selling the equity shares.

The Swiss experts also wanted to know when the forint will become convertible, what the government wishes to do about capital repatriation, and if a forint devaluation is imminent. Bekesi said that the forint is practically convertible for the business sphere, but it will take some time to achieve this in the population's monetary affairs. There are no obstacles to capital repatriation, but they would like to encourage investors to keep some of their savings in Hungarian banks. This will be facilitated by allowing people classed as foreigners under the Foreign Exchanges Act to also have current accounts in Hungary from January. The new foreign exchange code will also come into force, which can again stimulate investments and savings in foreign currency. Bekesi acknowledged that capital repatriation is an existing problem. However, in his view, while export and import fraud must basically be prevented by police measures, it is only possible to "fight" against capital repatriation with predictable and stable entrepreneurial conditions. He indicated that forint devaluations are not normally advertised in advance. In the future, the central bank will strive for a slow exchange-rate adjustment policy to be implemented in small steps, which will correct the difference between the foreign and the domestic inflation levels. In 1995, producer prices are expected to increase by 10-12 percent, while the forecasts of countries in the basket of currencies indicate a 3-to-5-percent increase. From the difference between the two, it is possible to calculate the devaluations in 1995, but this will not be implemented in one step. Therefore, there is no point in speculating on this, Bekesi noted.

Minister Comments on Devaluation, Budget Control

AU1110172394 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 11 Oct 94 p 10

[Article by "P.L.": "Close to Public Life—Bekesi and Kuncze Reply to NEPSZABADSAG's and 168 ORA's Questions"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Finance Minister Laszlo Bekesi and Interior Minister Gabor Kuncze answered readers' questions from NEPSZABADSAG and 168 ORA in the program "Close to Public Life" on Hungarian Television's Channel 1 on 8 October. The one-hour program was moderated by Akos Mester. [passage omitted]

Mester said that many letters had been received asking what kind of economic stimulation the government has done so far.

In his reply, Bekesi said that the government had not had the chance to do very much in two months. He said that the first proposals are already before parliament. One of them is aimed at reducing the state's overspending, which will improve conditions on the money market to a certain extent because it will not siphon off so much money from the economy, and more might be left for entrepreneurs. The other measure, Bekesi recalled, gives an export advantage to exporters through devaluing the forint. We are in the process of drawing up the 1995 package, which will contain preferences for investment, Bekesi said. [passage omitted]

The next question was: "How much longer will the government tolerate a situation in which those living on wages and salaries should maintain the country, while entrepreneurs do not pay income tax or social security contributions in proportion to their income?" This view was expressed by a 42-year-old female middle school teacher with two high-level qualifications, whose gross monthly earnings are 31,200 forints, Mester said.

Bekesi said that Hungary will continue to be based on the labor of people living on wages and salaries for a very long time to come. Their role is decisive in ensuring the country's life and operation, even if they have to account for every forint. It is at least as important as this that the increasing number of enterprises operate with improving results. "I believe that, in some years' time, well-functioning enterprises will support the majority of the country, and I also believe that they will pay more tax than they do at the moment," Bekesi said.

A reader asked to what extent the restrictive economic policy represented by Bekesi, as opposed to the softer economic policy of Prime Minister Gyula Horn, prevails or is reflected in the government's measures.

In Bekesi's view, it is natural for the finance minister to advocate and try to implement a firmer, stricter, tougher, and more consistent economic policy. The prime minister, who is above all a politician, thinks in broader terms and tries to give positive answers to all kinds of society's sensitivities. The two cannot always be reconciled with each other, Bekesi said in conclusion.

Should you decide to change your career, I suggest the diplomatic field, Mester noted after this reply.

To this remark, Bekesi said: "I have not yet been given a chance to do this, but, sooner or later, a situation will probably be created when I will choose this way of escape."

The following was asked in a letter: "Are you not worried that, on the basis of the proposals of the prime minister's advisory body, decisions that negate the Finance Ministry's planned measures will be made?"

On the contrary, Bekesi said, I have been on very good terms with these people for a long time, and I respect and appreciate their views and knowledge. They can only confirm the economic policy we hope will be consistently implemented by the government.

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Kolodziejczyk Discusses Resignation Plans

WS1410134994 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 14 Oct 94 p 1

[Article by Pawel Wronski: "Decision To Be Made by Prime Minister; MON Head Will Tender Resignation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk accuses the president of disregarding facts. He announces, however, that he will tender his resignation regardless of the result of the investigation into the "Drawsko case." Will the prime minister accept his resignation?

"This is my great bother, my dilemma. The president continues to be my commander and my superior. However, I firmly deny what we heard at the meeting with the Freedom Union," said Kolodziejczyk yesterday at a press conference held after his meeting with Willem van Eekelen, secretary general of the Western European Union.

Lech Walesa accused Kolodziejczyk on Wednesday of "not acting as a man of honor." The president conceded that two weeks ago in Drawsko he conducted a poll on whether Kolodziejczyk and General Wilecki, head of the General Staff, might cooperate with each other. Most of the generals decided that they might not and, at that point, according to the president, Kolodziejczyk allegedly said he would resign in a week.

Kolodziejczyk declared that he is ready to hand in his resignation, irrespective of the results of the investigation a special Sejm subcommittee is conducting. The resignation must be accepted by Pawlak.

The prime minister met with Kolodziejczyk a week ago, immediately after Walesa demanded that he submit his resignation in writing.

"The prime minister assured me that he could see no reason for my being recalled," Kolodziejczyk said yesterday. The head of the National Defense Ministry [MON] was supported in this conflict by all of the Sejm groupings except the Confederation for an Independent Poland and the Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms.

Deputy Minister Jerzy Milewski, who as recently as May headed the Belweder's National Security Office, firmly defended his superior. According to Milewski, the ministry must oppose the Army's attempts to become independent. "In the Army, you must not do anything quietly. The Army is maintained by taxpayers, and those who have been democratically elected should be given access to what is going on there."

If Pawlak did not accept Kolodziejczyk's dismissal and the Sejm committee decided that his main opponent, General Wilecki, head of the General Staff, had acted improperly in Drawsko, the minister would be able to suspend the staff head and punish the other generals.

The first session of the Sejm subcommittee, set up on Wednesday for the purpose of investigating the crisis in MON, will be held today. Kolodziejczyk and other members of the civilian leadership of MON will provide explanations of the situation.

Van Eekelen looked surprised at what is happening in Poland. He stressed that all of this was an internal Polish affair. However, he hinted that "the most important thing is the priority of politics over the Army." He also expressed the conviction that "civilian control over the Army in Poland will be strengthened after all of this."

As a result of Minister Kolodziejczyk's decision, the person who has found himself in the most difficult situation is the prime minister. If Pawlak rejects the resignation, he will start an open war with the president, which he has always avoided.

If he accepts it, he will run the risk of waging a war with the Sejm and even the risk of breaking the coalition with the Democratic Left Alliance.

Poll: Most Say Generals Should Be Punished

WS1410130994 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 14 Oct 94 p 1

[Article by (opr. krzem.): "Should the Generals Be Punished?"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Should the generals be punished?	
Yes	45 percent
No	23 percent
Hard to tell	32 percent

The generals should be punished because, in Drawsko, in front of Lech Walesa, they supported the idea of dismissing the defense minister. This was the opinion expressed by almost half of the inhabitants of Warsaw questioned by the Public Opinion Research Center [CBOS] at the request of GAZETA WYBORCZA.

A definite majority of the respondents (71 percent) had no doubt that, when he demanded that Minister Kolodziejczyk be recalled, Walesa was thinking about strengthening his own power.

Only 17 percent of the respondents believe that the president is guided by the interest of the state in this affair. People with leftist views, as compared to supporters of the center and the right wing, expressed particularly sharp criticism of the president's intentions.

Opinions regarding who should head the Ministry of National Defense were divided very evenly. Half of the respondents (49 percent) believe that it should be a professional military officer. Forty-one percent were in favor of a civilian.

The results of this research, which was conducted extremely quickly, should be interpreted rather cautiously: The sample was not numerous, and the people came from Warsaw only.

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The poll was carried out by CBOS on 12 October on a quantative sample of 300 adult inhabitants of Warsaw.

Pawlak Attends Meeting on Adapting to EU Norms

LD1310115294 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1017 GMT 13 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 13 Oct—A meeting of the interdepartmental team for adapting the Polish economy and legal system to the requirements of the Treaty on Association of Poland with the European Union is being held today at the Council of Ministers' Office. The meeting is being attended by Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak.

The discussion focuses, among other things, on the system of work organization at central offices aimed at adapting the Polish economy to EU legal norms. A review will also be made during the meeting on the state of the implementation of specific recommendations included in the treaty by individual government departments.

Members of the team will also deal with preparations for a meeting between the Polish Government and EU representatives in December, within the framework of the Poland-EU Association Committee.

Daily Says Walesa Splitting Right Wing

WS1310131094 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 13 Oct 94 p 3

[Article by Wojciech Zaluska: "President's Campaign; Abutments on Right Wing"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The attempt to remove the Movement for the Republic [RdR] from the Alliance for Poland [PdP] has been unsuccessful. The idea was backed by the Center Accord [PC] and the conservatives. However, they met with opposition from the Christian-National Union [ZChN] and the Peasant Accord [PL]. These events within the PdP will certainly make the president happier; divisions on the right side of the political scene are playing into his hands.

Leaders of the PC and the Conservative Coalition [KK] accuse RdR Chairman Romuald Szeremietiew of being disloyal. They claim that he is politically closer to the Belweder than to the right wing. They add that, for example, he is prepared to accept Lech Walesa's offer and replace Piotr Kolodziejczyk as the head of the Ministry of National Defense.

Bad Behavior

"Such behavior is not acceptable to us," say the conservatives. "The PdP is building up its image by stressing its opposition to the Belweder and to the postcommunist government. None of our voters understand Szeremietiew's behavior."

A similar opinion was issued a week ago by the PdP Council. Leaders of the PC, the KK, the ZChN, and the PL delivered Szeremietiew an ultimatum: either promise that he will not accept any posts offered by the Belweder, or he will leave the PdP.

Even though the RdR leader did not choose either of the two, this threat was not put into effect. Last Tuesday the ZChN and the PL changed their minds. In both of these parties, Walesa's supporters constitute a strong lobby, and the parties' leaders do not want to start any conflicts with them. The resolution of the "Szeremietiew" problem was postponed.

The Anticommunist Front

Developments within the PdP will certainly satisfy the president. For a year now, he has been trying to take a leading position in the right wing. He has been trying to form an "anticommunist front" with it. After the last parliamentary election, he offered Wieslaw Chrzanowski [ZChN leader at that time] a post in his Chancellery. However, he was unsuccessful.

The right wing soon established the PdP. People unfavorably disposed toward Walesa (such as Jaroslaw Kaczynski and Kazimierz Michal Ujazdowski) began playing first fiddle there.

Therefore, Walesa reached for politicians of lesser stature. He appointed Henryk Goryszewski, who was being pushed to the margin within the ZChN, as head of the National Security Office. Rumors of coaxing Szeremietiew have been circulating for months. They were confirmed by the RdR leader's evolution. Right after the election, he compared Walesa to a coachman who, trying to save himself from wolves, is throwing out more and more passengers to be devoured by them. Then his statements changed and were more favorable to the president.

Preparation for Division

What does Walesa need the right wing for? Does he want to form a presidential camp with it? This is not very likely. Such a "camp" is already being formed by Walesa elsewhere. He is following in the footsteps of Pilsudski; he is seeking support in the Army.

The president does not need the ZChN, the PC, the KK, the PL, or the RdR. He wants to have the votes of the entire anticommunist electorate. He may win them unless the right wing fields a countercandidate. This is why he is trying to split it up. Goryszewski and Szeremietiew are the first abutments of the Belweder in the PdP. Thanks to them he can exert influence on the coalition. Even if they do not manage to win the right wing over to the president, they may paralyze its moves.

An Attempt To Counterattack

On Tuesday, the PC and the KK attempted to counterattack. Szeremietiew's removal was to be a signal: "Pro-Belweder activities will not be tolerated." However, this was an abortive attempt.

A few days ago, Walesa's supporters carried the day once again. The ZChN congress in Czestochowa called upon the party to back the president. If in January the ZChN national congress makes a similar appeal, the PdP will find itself in a crisis, and the unification process in the right wing will be impeded.

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UDMR Stance on Romanian-Hungarian Treaty

94BA0423B Bucharest ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO in Hungarian 7 Sep 94 p 3

[Statement signed in Cluj on 26 August 1994 by Bela Marko and Csaba Takacs, chairman and managing director respectively of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania: "The Position Taken by the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania on the Romanian-Hungarian Basic Treaty"—revised translation]

[FBIS Translated Text] As the legitimate interest group of Hungarians in Romania, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ in Hungarian—UDMR in Romanian] is following the process of drafting a Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty in the hope that the process includes some measures that strengthen confidence, which, in turn, might produce beneficial changes in the relationship between the two countries and in the life of the Hungarian national minority in Romania.

Beginning in 1989, historic changes have occurred in the Central and East European region. The termination of a bipolar world, free elections held in the countries of the region, and the processes of evolving European integration have provided new content to relationships between neighboring countries.

In this context, the RMDSZ believes that it is of decisive significance in the relationship between Romania and Hungary that almost two million Hungarians in Romania and tens of thousands of Romanians in Hungary pursue their lives as minorities.

The RMDSZ regards the following to be of fundamental importance:

I. The governments and parliaments of the two countries should involve the legitimate representatives of the Hungarian minority of Romania and of the Romanian minority of Hungary in drafting treaties that spell out conditions for good neighbor relations.

II. The basic treaty should include a detailed Agreement on the Protection of Minorities as an integral part of the treaty, prepared in due regard to rights and needs stated and described by the legitimate organizations of Hungarians in Romania and Romanians in Hungary.

The RMDSZ regards the following as the conceptual base for the protection of minorities:

A. The Romanian and Hungarian national minorities could actively advance the evolution and strengthening of good neighbor relations and they could take part in the development of vehicles for multifaceted and mutual cooperation between Romania and the Hungarian Republic, positively influencing European integration.

B. The indigenous Hungarian and Romanian national minorities within the territories of Romania and the Hungarian Republic have their own historical legacies, and their institutional forms as well as their ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic peculiarities stem from those legacies, the preservation of which is a basic condition for the survival of these minorities.

C. Standards established in international documents for the protection of human and civil rights and of minorities, such as the UN charter, the International Agreement on Civil and Political Rights, the Paris Charter, the Helsinki Final Accord of the CSCE and its Geneva Recommendations, and the European Charter of Regional and Minority Languages should serve as the general framework for an agreement having the force of law and serving the purpose of preserving the identity of the Romanian and Hungarian national minorities, with special attention to the Copenhagen Document on European Security and Cooperation, the 1992 UN Proclamation on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities, and to Recommendation No. 1201 (1993) of the Council of Europe. At the same time, existing models in Europe—such as the autonomous systems that exist in Italy, Spain, Finland, and Belgium, all of which are internationally regarded as constitutional solutions—must also be recognized.

D. Based on the Gyulafehervar [Alba Iulia] Proclamation, and on the agreement on minorities reached after World War I, Romania has a duty to appropriately resolve the minority issue.

An agreement on protecting minorities must state the rights and civil rights to which national minorities residing in the two countries are entitled, as well as the commitment of the parties to the agreement to secure these rights.

The agreement must state that the parties to the agreement shall

1. protect the national identity of minorities and enhance, secure, nurture, develop, and transmit the preservation of such identity by way of appropriate legal, legislative, administrative and other measures, thus ensuring the right of minorities to their own cultures and to opportunities to use their native languages and symbols;

2. recognize and secure the right of minorities to render autonomous decisions within an appropriate legal framework regarding the preservation, nurturing, and transmittal of their identities, to enforce such decisions through their own, independent institutional systems, as well as to participate in state decision making processes affecting minority identity, and in the implementation of such decisions;

3. based on the principle of internal self-determination, recognize the right of persons belonging to the Hungarian minority in Romania to personal and local self-administration and to forms of regional autonomy, and provide for the legal, institutional, and financial conditions needed for the exercise of such rights;

4. provide a special legal status for elected local authorities in areas where persons belonging to the Hungarian minority are in a majority;

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5. commit themselves not to take actions which artificially change, to the detriment of the respective minorities, the ethnic composition of areas where the inhabitants include national minorities;

6. recognize and ensure the right of national minorities to establish and maintain their own associations and their independent cultural, religious, and social institutions;

7. recognize the right of persons belonging to the Hungarian minority in Romania to study in their native language and to receive instruction in the native language at every level of education, as well as the right of natural persons belonging to this minority and of minority churches, organizations, and corporations to establish and maintain religious and private institutions; and ensure conditions for the national minorities to protect and preserve their historic relics;

8. provide for the development of an educational network that includes every form and degree of teaching and professional training;

9. recognize the right of persons belonging to the Hungarian minority in Romania to use their native language in both private and public life, i.e., in the framework of government administration, the administration of justice, health care provisions, religious life, education and culture, public institutions and the public service media;

10. ensure that vital records registries use first names and family names in the native language, and that the first names and family names of historical personalities are expressed in the native language;

11. ensure the right to equality before the law and to equal treatment in the political, economic, social and cultural fields; and take legal, legislative and government administrative steps to realize equal opportunity;

12. ensure that persons belonging to the Hungarian minority in Romania, as well as their associations and organizations, are able to maintain multifaceted, free, and direct relations with the citizens of the Hungarian Republic and with Hungary's state and public institutions.

Along with the recognition of the enumerated rights and obligations to protect, we count on resolving issues not involving cumbersome legal proceedings within the shortest possible period of time, **by way of governmental action or other provisions,** as follows:

1. returning in kind to the original, rightful owners real property and possessions that were acquired from the churches, minority associations, and institutions of the Hungarian national minority after 1945 as a result of laws violating private ownership or by force, i.e., in an illegal manner;

2. restoring Bolyai University as the comprehensive institution of higher education of Hungarians in Romania;

3. resolving the issue regarding the recognition of diplomas acquired abroad;

4. requiring the following of local authorities operating in local government administrative units in which the number of persons belonging to the Hungarian minority amounts to 10 percent of the populace:

—to also designate in the Hungarian language the names of settlements, streets, squares, and public institutions;

—to also publish in the Hungarian language printed forms used in the course of public administrative proceedings;

—to accept petitions and other documents in the Hungarian language and to ensure that responses are given in the native language.

5. before an independent institutional system is established, ensuring that representation in public institutions is proportionate to the demographic presence;

6. restoring the Hungarian consulate in Kolozsvar [Cluj-Napoca], and the Romanian consulate in Debrecen.

The Agreement must contain **appropriate guarantees.** We regard the following legislative duties, institutions, and mechanisms as such guarantees:

a. the parties agree to formulate their legal order pursuant to the provisions of the basic treaty, by ratifying the European Charter for Local Governments and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, and by establishing the institution of minority commissioner;

b. they establish a joint committee to oversee the implementation of the Agreement on the Protection of Minorities; the joint committee should include representatives of legitimate Romanian and Hungarian minority organizations;

c. they assist the activities of the minority high commissioner of the CSCE and ensure that the monitoring mechanisms of the Council of Europe prevail.

We consider it necessary that the parties to the basic treaty attest to their fundamental intent in the course of drafting the basic treaty by making positive decisions regarding issues considered just requirements by the Hungarian or Romanian minorities in their respective countries of residence.

We drafted our position based on historically proven opportunities for Romanian-Hungarian cooperation and on the perspective of European integration. We are convinced that based on these foundations, the two countries would be able to enter into a basic treaty that could serve as a pattern for the countries of this region, and once in force, could significantly increase the stability and security of the region.

Kolozsvar, 26 August 1994

BELA MARKO, Union Chairman

CSABA TAKACS, Managing Director

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UN Officials: Peacekeeping Mission at 'Dead End'

AU1310185894 Paris AFP in English 1840 GMT 13 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Oct 13 (AFP)—The UN peacekeeping operation in Bosnia is at a dead end, UN officials said Thursday, calling on the world body to ditch the blue helmet approach and use NATO ground forces to enforce peace.

"We are at the end of the road on peacekeeping," said one senior official who asked not to be named.

"The Bosnian Serbs are trying to test the resolve of UNPROFOR (the UN Protection Force) and frankly NATO should cut the horse-shit about more robust" air-strikes in response to Bosnian Serb violations of UN resolutions.

The official agreed with UN Bosnia commander Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Rose that "you can't fight a war with white-painted tanks," and called for a green helmet operation which would respond to Serb attacks with superior force.

"The only way you can cajole the Bosnian Serbs back to the negotiating table is with a credible use of force. That is going to come through NATO," the source said.

"The only thing that will scare the Serbs is if you will put large amounts of troops in."

UN threats of force had lost all credibility because of a damaging row between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the United Nations.

The rift was highlighted earlier this month when U.S. Defence Secretary William Perry's called for an end to "pinprick" airstrikes and for NATO to extract a heavy price from the Serbs for violationg UN resolutions.

But UN ground commanders insist on the "appropriate and proportional use of force," and are reluctant to order airstrikes which they say serve only to raise tensions.

In reality, UN officials admit they are reluctant to order airstikes because the Serbs can punish all attacks by holding UNPROFOR to ransom over its supply convoys, and can cut off Sarajevo's utility supplies at will.

The Serbs riposted NATO's September 22 airstrike against an ageing Serb T-55 violating the 20-kilometre (12.5-mile) Sarajevo heavy weapons exclusion zone (TEZ), by closing down the airport for two weeks, and pulling the plug on gas, water and electricity supplies.

And they had punished UNPROFOR for ordering the attack by blockading its convoys, leaving the UN operation in Sarajevo critically short of fuel, with fuel stock estimates ranging from two days to one week.

In order to maintain a dialogue with the Serbs Rose has hopelessly compromised UNPROFOR's peacekeeping mission, UN officials here charge, bending over backwards to accomodate the Serbs, downplaying their transgressions and playing up incidents involving the Moslem-led Bosnian government.

A senior UN official cited a Rose statement on Saturday's Serb sniper attack—made jointly with sector Sarajevo commander Major- General Herve Gobilliard—on a tram which left one man dead and 12 people wounded, and a Bosnian sniper attack in which two Serb women escaped injury.

He accused UNPROFOR of deliberately muzzling initial reports of Serb tanks breaching the TEZ and Serb threats to oust Bosnian forces from the UN-monitored demilitarized zone on Mount Igman.

That contrasted with threats by Rose to order airstrikes against Bosnian troops inside the DMZ and the huge security operation mounted by UN forces to escort Bosnian soldiers out of the area at gunpoint.

Nevertheless, officials contacted here recognized Rose has achieved much since he took command of UN forces in Bosnia at the beginning of the year.

They say the defining moment of his command came with the signing of a ceasefire agreement in February and the creation of a 20-kilometre (12.5-mile) heavy weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo.

The threat of airstrikes by warplanes from NATO ended the shelling of the Bosnian capital overnight, dramatically improving living conditions in the city.

That success was followed in March by the creation of the so- called civilian blue routes in which new life was breathed into the city as commercial traffic resumed and food and goods flooded in until end of July.

An anti-sniping accord reached August 14, which included the deployment of special anti-sniping units to target known snipers' nests, has been accompanied by a reduction in sniper attacks.

But UNPROFOR has no bargaining chip with the Serbs who are sitting pretty now the threat of the lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnians has faded.

Silajdzic Views European Parliament Resolution

LD1310233894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 13 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] As is known, Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic and Federal Deputy Prime Minister Jadranko Prlic recently visited the European Parliament in Brussels. Their visit produced swift and concrete action by the European Parliament, which has adopted a resolution on Bosnia-Herzegovina, on which Prime Minister Silajdzic commented this evening:

[Begin Silajdzic recording] We are going to emphasize the following parts of the resolution: This is a resolution adopted by the European Parliament which is very important for us; (?the emphasis is on the improvement) of the situation regarding the isolation of Sarajevo and other

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protected areas, particularly the interruption of water and crude oil supplies and the continuation of ethnic cleansing in Bosnian Serb-occupied territories.

Further, it contains the conclusion that the international community has failed to punish the Bosnian Serbs for refusing to accept the peace plan—the European Parliament's support for effective control of the borders between Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, the affirmation of Bosnia-Herzegovina's right to self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, recognition and support for the nations of Bosnia-Herzegovina in their struggle to preserve a multiethnic and multicultural society under such horrible attacks.

The European Parliament has tasked the European Union [EU] with lending support to the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and with helping the legitimate authorities in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina establish and maintain relations with the international community. The European Union should fulfill its duties as an administrator in the best way possible, such as in the case of Mostar—this is support for the EU administration in Mostar. It should open up the PHARE and TEMPUS [EU aid] programs to Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is very important. It should [word indistinct] and support cooperation between Croats and Bosniaks by political means.

The European Parliament also warns that the [word indistinct] aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina [words indistinct] assaults elsewhere and ensure that the restoration of peace and security along the borders [words indistinct] The parliament also urges the intensification of aid given to the population of Bosnia- Herzegovina ahead of the coming winter and the insistence that all measures be taken to achieve this goal.

And finally a decision has been made to send an ad hoc delegation of the European Parliament to the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to include visits to Sarajevo, Mostar, and Tuzla, and also attendance at the opening of the autumn [word indistinct] assembly which has, as you know, been postponed until 2 November.

[Words indistinct] in addition to what I have read out, the importance of this European Parliament resolution lies in the fact that many articles have recently appeared in foreign media trying to bring into question the democratic, multiethnic, and multicultural orientation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government. The European Parliament resolution represents obvious support given by the European Parliament in the best possible way. I think this is the best result of what we have been trying to (?achieve) as (?the leadership of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina). [end recording]

Ganic Protests UNPROFOR 'Failure To React'

AU1310211994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency member and Federation Vice President Ejup Ganic today addressed a protest letter on behalf of the Presidency to the UN secretary general's special envoy Yasushi Akashi, prompted by the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] failure to react to the massive employment of heavy artillery weapons in the Sarajevo exclusion zone by Karadzic's Serbs.

The letter states that yesterday, Karadzic's Serbs fired over 1,000 heavy artillery shells and rockets from nine artillery positions—all of them known to UNPROFOR—located within the 20-km exclusion zone at Bosnia-Herzegovina Army positions also located within the Sarajevo exclusion zone.

In a meeting with the head of UNPROFOR Headquarters for Bosnia-Herzegovina that took place late last night, the location of the artillery positions and the activity perpetrated from them were not disputed, and I was told that the UNPROFOR command had more or less the same information, Ganic writes.

The UNPROFOR command in Bosnia-Herzegovina has, by gradually tolerating the presence of the aggressor's artillery within the 20-km exclusion zone, led to a situation in which there is now a far greater amount of artillery weapons within the zone that is not under the control [words indistinct]. The behavior of certain UNPROFOR commanders contradicts the document dated 9 February 1994 and has led to a situation where shells rain down on the hills surrounding Sarajevo daily. We ask ourselves who is conducting and who is behind the policy that encourages the aggressor, that is, why are actions contrary to official documents, the publicly declared UN policy, and the agreement with NATO? The Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina sharply protests the behavior of certain commanders and UNPROFOR commands, the letter sent by Ejup Ganic to Yasushi Akashi states.

Rumors Claim Bicakcic To Replace Silajdzic

AU1310204394 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 12 Oct 94 p 10

[Report by Zdravko Latal: "Prime Minister in Conflict With His Own Party"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 11 October—Two topics currently reign on the Sarajevo list of rumors; the offensive of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army on all fronts and a conflict between Dr. Haris Silajdzic, prime minister and vice president of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA], and the party caucus. It is true that there has been no official confirmation about the cooling of relations, however, nobody has officially denied these rumors either. The first man in the SDA is President of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency Alija Izetbegovic and, for this reason, it is being rumored that the relations between the two most influential Muslims are frayed—not to mention the powerful chief of the Islamic religious community, Dr. Mustafa Ceric, who accomplished the removal of more than 600 kg of pork from the Sarajevo shops with a single word.

Certain people have been attacking Dr. Silajdzic since the beginning of the war, when he was still foreign minister,

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and after he was appointed prime minister the attacks on him intensified. The gap started to widen dangerously when he was publicly proposed as prime minister designate, however, on that occasion, President Izetbegovic bridged it successfully. In several consecutive issues, the weekly HAVAZ [the Voice] tried to tarnish the prime minister's reputation by publishing police documents about the criminal activities of Silajdzic's brother Husref. DELO also wrote about this. According to some information, a rather powerful Sandzak lobby led by former Bosnian Army commander Sefer Halilovic is standing behind HAVAZ. The general believes that he was unjustly deposed and sacrificed for the sake of better relations with Tudjman.

Silajdzic is not liked by the Bosnian Army either as his cabinet has not done enough for the social security of soldiers and the families of fallen soldiers and invalids. Dissatisfaction mounted after the signing of an agreement between the Bosnian Army and the HVO [Croatian Defense Council]. It transpired that a soldier in Herceg-Bosna receives at least 300 German marks per month and enjoys numerous benefits, even if he has not fought for several months, while some detachments have not clashed with the Serbs for over a year. There are no such payments in the Bosnian Army; soldiers only get cigarettes, flour, and, in the best case, a parcel for the family. They are, therefore, waging partisan warfare, that is, fighting out of patriotism. However, two and a half years have proven to be too much for the empty stomachs of soldiers and their families. Dissatisfaction is understandable. Nobody can survive on patriotism, they can only die.

The attacks on Mr. Silajdzic intensified even further after the deposition of one of the best professional policemen; the commander of the Sarajevo Public Security Center, Munir Alibabic. Prior to his replacement, Alibabic sent a letter to the presidency in which he implicated Interior Minister Bakir Alispahic and several high officials in his ministry. Because of the strong proof, President Izetbegovic was forced to form a state committee to investigate the matter. Namely, he accused the Interior Ministry of bugging telephone conversations of Dr. Silajdzic and another two presidency members on the instructions of the interior minister himself with the explanation that this was a precautionary measure, although bugging can only by authorized by the presidency. For this reason, it is not clear why the security measures were only implemented against Silajdzic and two others, whose names are not known. A senior Bosnian Army official emphasized that Alibabic made a big mistake in accusing the Interior Ministry of 53 illegal actions as three would have sufficed: Activities connected to drugs, the bugging of senior state officials, and an investigation against two top spies by the State Security Service that was so poorly executed that one of them had to be released and the other was only sentenced for falsifying a drivers' license and will be released from prison in the next few days.

Alibabic wanted to be consistent and, in the letter, mentioned numerous other irregularities that were not negligible, but which would have been better mentioned some other time or at least after the presidency has studied the first batch of evidence. Alibabic thus exposed the fact that the Interior Ministry had appointed as the commander of the Republican State Security Service a Croatian security service agent Jozo Jezic, who should have been punished rather than appointed as first secretary at the embassy in Ljubljana. Alibabic claims that had warned the interior minister prior to the appointment that Jezic was not suitable because he had stolen extremely important documents and a sought-after dossier by Father Krunoslav Draganovic, one of the key witnesses of the relations between the Croatian Catholic Church and Pavelic's NDH (Independent State of Croatia), and handed it over to Zagreb. Let me remind you that one of the biggest successes of the Yugoslav UDBA [State Security Service] was precisely "the relocation" of Draganovic from The Vatican to Yugoslavia. On the basis of his testimony, UDBA compiled a document that numerous international intelligence service and even historians tried to lay their hands on.

One of the most powerful accusations was definitely the misuse of seized drugs. The commission, which has already investigated this case, concluded that only a few "shots" had disappeared. The discovery that documents and specifications relating to the seized drugs did not match was more significant. They have informed the public about it, however, not everything was explained in the statement. The Sarajevo weekly BOSNA claims that the statement was written by Presidency member Dr. Ivo Komsic and adviser Jusuf Pusina, but that the text that was released to the public was not their creation. As to who altered the text and who in the Presidency has the right to decide what and which statements are made public, the weekly BOSNA makes no suggestion.

However, all this does not conclude the Alibabic case yet. Sarajevo is expecting a new offensive and counteroffensive. DELO has learned from reliable sources that it is only a matter of days before Interior Minister Bakir Alispahic will move over to diplomacy. This is supposedly also a demand by Prime Minister Silajdzic of Izetbegovic. For this reason, a rumor has started circulating in Sarajevo that SDA Vice President (the party has five vice presidents) Edhem Bicakcic, director of the Bosnia-Herzegovina electric power industry, will be appointed in Silajdzic's place. These rumors were most probably started by Silajdzic's opponents, one of Alija Izetbegovic's assistants told DELO, and for this reason new blows and counter blows are expected at any time. He added that Izetbegovic definitely would not give up his cooperation with the prime minister even though he is not satisfied with the way he runs the government. Some people even claim that the SDA would not accept Silajdzic's resignation or replacement, as it believes him to be a freedom-loving man of Western civilization, which cannot be said of numerous senior SDA politicians who advocate the preservation of traditional eastern values.

Anything is possible in Sarajevo and Bosnia. For this reason, some people believe that Alibabic's snowball will thunder into the valley like an avalanche, while others trust

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Izetbegovic, who, they believe, knows how to preserve party unit, for which he is compared to Tito.

Krajisnik Rejects Juppe Confederation Proposal

LD1310173794 Sarajevo Radio Republike Srpske Program for Abroad in Serbo-Croatian 1630 GMT 13 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the Srpska republic parliament, rejected the possibility of confederal links between the Srpska republic and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] without prior recognition of the Srpska republic's complete independence. We want to unite with the FRY, but we consider the offer that the Srpska republic should form a confederation with Yugoslavia, while remaining part of the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to be a swindle, Krajisnik told BETA agency in response to the international community's readiness to grant the Bosnian Serbs the right to form a confederation with Yugoslavia.

Such a possibility has been announced by French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe.

Krajisnik said that if Bosnia-Herzegovina remains an internationally recognized state, a confederation which the Bosnian Serbs would form with the FRY—while still in such a union —would be in the spirit of regional alliances which exist between certain European regions. We cannot accept such links. In that way, as an independent state, we can form links with any other European state or region, Krajisnik said. We want the two independent states—Yugoslavia and the Srpska republic—to be united into one state, he specified.

According to him, acceptance of the international community's peace plan is impossible without a correction of the division maps for Bosnia-Herzegovina which the Serbs rejected at their referendum. The existing maps cannot be accepted, Krajisnik said categorically.

Croats Blame Bosniaks for Federation Delay

AU1410113194 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 11 Oct 94 p 5

[Article by S. Lovrenovic: "Who Is Running Away From the BiH Federation?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mostar—The implementation of the Zagreb Agreement that was signed by the representatives of the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is running late, and the Bosniak leadership is trying to hinder the establishment of federal organs wherever it can. The Presidential Council of the HR [Croatian Republic] of Herceg-Bosna has discussed several contentious issues such as the return of refugees, the appointment of ministers to vacant positions in the government, the setting up of provisional organs of authority in municipalities and cantons, the representation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in other states and international organizations, and established that there were significant inconsistencies in the behavior of the Muslim side. Therefore, it was decided to seek the postponement of the federal assembly session scheduled for 17 October until a political solution was found through political talks.

Even though the unconditional return of all refugees and expelled and displaced persons to their homes was agreed on, especially the victims of the conflict between the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosniak side insists on the conditional return of the expelled Croats to central Bosnia. The emigration of Croats continues and the few people who have returned are hiding from the local authorities in order to avoid expulsion and harassment.

Nothing has come of the agreed proportional national representation in diplomatic-consular offices. The stands of the Bosnia-Herzegovina representatives at the UN Security Council session and in talks with U.S. President Clinton are not in line with the spirit of the Zagreb Agreement. The Croatian side had not been consulted at all, and Jadranko Prlic [Bosnia-Herzegovina's deputy prime minister and defense minister] was reproached for being in that delegation. However, if the presence of Jadranko Prlic can be justified with the need for the defense minister to take part in the talks on lifting the arms embargo, the fact that the Croatian side was again ignored in foreign affairs activities only a few days after the signing of the Zagreb Agreement cannot be justified.

As the filling of vacant positions in the government and its services is not being met with the approval of the Bosniak side, and considering that the deadlines for setting up municipal and cantonal organs of authorities are not being observed, one wonders what is left of the Washington and Zagreb Agreements. Can one take as correct the assumptions that the Muslim side does not care about anything except securing the free flow of goods from Metkovic to Doboj and the use of Ploce port, as well as the collection of the revenue from customs and taxes for Sarajevo—where the Muslims would have full control, while not even thinking about the joint Bosniak-Muslim state?

Although the Bosniak leaders in their speeches always insist on the "joint state" and the "entry of the Croats in the Bosnia-Herzegovina organs," they are constantly setting new conditions. Every incident in the territories controlled by the HVO and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the HR of Herzeg Bosnia are so "blown out of proportion" by the media that it appears that the Croatian side is undermining the Federation.

Among the Croats there are also those who are against a Croat- Muslim state, but these are certainly not the signatories of the agreement and the political leadership, as is the case, judging by its conduct, with the Muslim side. The result of this can only be a new Muslim-Croat conflict. And who needs that?

EU Administration Discusses Mostar Evictions

AU1310193994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 13 Oct 94

[Report by Zlata Behan from Mostar]

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[FBIS Translated Text] The eviction of Muslims from their apartments in the part of the city under the control of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] is an everyday occurrence in Mostar. The tenants are either thrown out into the street or are banished to the eastern part of the city, while refugees from Konjic, Vares, or families of HVO members in Mostar are moved into the apartments. Representatives of the eastern part of Mostar have for days, months, been lodging protests with the European Administration. Many of the people actually evicted from their own apartments are doing the same. That is why the EU Administration has made a proposal to freeze the relocation process while it drafts uniform regulations pertaining to housing for the entire city. Rusmir Cicic, president of the Mostar city authorities, insisted that these tasks be carried out in as short a period of time as possible, within 10 to 15 days, so that the authorities from both parts of the city and the population can be acquainted with the regulations.

The EU Administration today also decided to start repairs on the court building, so that judicial bodies of both sides can be housed there. This would finalize the process of creating a joint judiciary in Mostar. The creation of a joint court would further the work of the judiciary, [words indistinct] of uniform regulations and a uniform police. (Mr. Klaus Metter), Hans Koschnick's deputy, promised that another 32 German policemen, together with equipment, would arrive by the end of the month. The European police in Mostar would then number some 100 policemen. At the same time, police forces from the eastern and western parts of Mostar are being assembled, which would bring the total number of the EU Administration's police to 300. All the policemen would wear the same uniforms, have the same equipment, would have a single command, and would patrol the entire territory of Mostar under the UN Administration.

The EU Administration meeting today also discussed the problem of arrival of humanitarian convoys and convoys carrying material indispensable to the eastern part of Mostar. President of the Mostar city authorities Rusmir Cicic stressed that the city is still under blockade. I believe that it is high time for the border crossing in Doljani to begin functioning as was agreed, said Cicic. All customs [word indistinct] should be carried out on this border crossing, after which the convoys should not be stopped until they reach their destination. The federal police should control this border crossing and thus not allow certain [words indistinct] to plunder and blackmail. Moreover, the Izetbegovic-Tudjman agreement, recently made in Zagreb, should be fully implemented by opening the M 17 route [words indistinct].

'State of War' in Mostar Denied

AU1310203894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Oct 94

[Report by Omer Karic from the 4th Corps Information Service]

[FBIS Translated Text] The population in the Mostar area was today disturbed by a dispatch from Mostar by Croatian Radio correspondent Zdenko Vranjes, who, in prime time newscasts and citing the Mostar Croatian Defense Council Political Administration, reported that a state of war has been proclaimed in Mostar as a result of fierce shelling of Bijelo Polje that has caused the population to flee toward Treznica. They are allegedly bringing with them a great number of killed and wounded members of the Muslim army in this region.

We have become used to hearing greater lies than this one that came from the right bank of Mostar, but we nevertheless have to ask who they can benefit at the moment, particularly in view of the efforts invested in the normalization of relations and the implementation of the Washington agreement. Such deceptions, primarily of the Croatian people, surely cannot constitute a basis for building trust in a joint federal state.

As far as the Chetnik aggressor is concerned, it is true that he has intensified his activity in the region in the past few days, but it is also true that the joint units of the 4th Corps have readily met the aggressor, and, in fierce counterattacks, inflicted serious losses on him. They have also expanded the free territory of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Lies and insinuations will not stop the 4th Corps troops and commanders; on the contrary, they will provide additional motivation for further successes.

Serbs Accuse Muslims of Offensive Near Mostar

LD1310183094 Sarajevo Radio Republike Srpske Program for Abroad in Serbo-Croatian 1630 GMT 13 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Fierce infantry and artillery duels have been going on between Mostar and Nevesinje on the Herzegovina battlefield since yesterday morning, TANJUG's correspondent has learned from Serb military sources. The command of the Serb units in that section of the battlefield claims that the Muslim forces were the first to attack and that, by charging from the direction of Bijelo Polje, north of Mostar, they are trying to push the defense lines back and advance toward the Nevesinje area.

It is stated that the Muslims have mobilized considerable infantry units and many artillery pieces and mortars for this operation, so in addition to infantry-fighting, powerful artillery duels are in progress as well. According to statements by the Serb command, the Muslims have not succeeded in breaking through the defense lines in any direction. There are no reports of casualties in the latest clashes in that section of the Herzegovina battlefield.

Serbs Continue Offensive Within Exclusion Zone

AU1310202094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The 1st Corps Information Service informs that in the course of the day, the enemy launched 14 howitzer shells from Trebevic at Mt. Igman. There was intense enemy regrouping and a frequent passage of military vehicles on the Doglodi-Dobrosevic, Tajlovac-Butile, and Ilidza-Blazuj routes.

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In the theater of operations controlled by the Visoko brigades the aggressor has been using small arms and antiaircraft weapons. There have been small arms provocations, and antiaircraft machine gun provocations on the (?Kralup) part of the front from the direction of Stijena and Spasovnica. The enemy from Dobrinjsko Brdo fired at Vlasicka Kosa. The Visoko-Buci route continues to be under constant sniper and machine gun fire. The aggressor also used an M-84 machine gun against Podvisoko. A 60-mm mortar targeted Pljesivica. The aggressor offensive against the free parts of Mt. Cemer is still in progress. Despite the immense engagement of weaponry and enemy manpower in the 20-km exclusion zone, Mt. Cemer is still in the hands of the 1st Corps members.

'Intensified' Serb Activity on Gorazde Front

AU1310195694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Fahrudin Becic, our correspondent from the free Gorazde territory, reports intensified Chetnik activity on the Rogatica route. The areas of Vrazalica, Vranovina, and Hranjine was also targeted by 105-mm and 152-mm howitzers, and 80-mm and 120-mm mortars. Several hundred shells landed on the area, while a 37-mm antiaircraft gun and a recoilless gun supported an infantry attack on Prosjek, which was repulsed. Our correspondent adds that the Chetniks used antiaircraft machine guns and antiaircraft guns against Bohovsko Brdo, Ruda Glava, and [name indistinct].

Continued Serb Attacks in Bihac Area Reported

AU1310160494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 13 Oct 94

[Report by Muhamed Mulic from the Bihac front]

[FBIS Translated Text] The enemy on the Grmusko-Srbljanksi plateau opened fierce small arms and artillery fire on the forward defense lines. The activity was supported by constant sniper fire. There was no peace on the Buzim, Bosanska Otoka, and Bosanska Krupa parts of the front. The aggressor on these fronts used small arms and antiaircraft weaponry, frequently supported by artillery, particularly mortars and tanks. Mortars and tanks were used to shell the Buzim part of the front this morning. The villages on this part of the front were also not spared. Enemy snipers and antiaircraft machine guns from Stari Grad targeted the northern part of Bosanska Krupa. Fortunately, there were no casualties.

UN Believes Bosnians Attacked Serbs From DMZ

AU1310144394 Paris AFP in English 1339 GMT 13 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Oct 13 (AFP)—Bosnian troops have attacked Serb forces on Mount Igman after possibly marching through a UN-monitored demilitarized zone for the second time in a week, a UN spokesman said Thursday.

Three Serbs were wounded in an attack in the Babin Do area, just outside the demilitarized zone which senior Serb, UN and Bosnian generals had been due to inspect Thursday to ensure it was free of troops, said UN Protection Force spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel Tim Spicer.

"The Bosnian Serbs were reinforcing one of their positions with a small platoon of men and during the course of that they were ambushed by a small number of BiH (Moslem-dominated Bosnian army)" troops.

"Our assessment is that they probably inflitrated from the DMZ. That would be the only logical approach road," said Spicer.

The attack occurred near a Serb command post where Bosnian commandos last Thursday killed 20 Serbs, including four military nurses.

UN troops were continuing sweeps through the area to clear it of Bosnian and Serb troops, he said.

The zone was created in August 1993 to halt a Serb advance which threatened to cut the only supply route into Sarajevo. They quit their positions in exchange for UN guarantees that Bosnian troops would not be allowed to recapture lost ground.

Spicer said Sarajevo sector commander, French Major-General Herve Gobilliard, had strongly protested a Bosnian decision to pull out of a planned inspection of the DMZ by senior UN, Bosnian and Serb generals to ensure the zone was being respected by both sides.

The Bosnians had said they were too busy with the clashes near Olovo, north of Sarajevo, to attend to inspection, he said.

But one senior UN officer, who asked not to be named, said "we think that they didn't come because they don't control the officer in command on Igman.

"He is not obeying orders and has refused to allow positions which he has spent a year building inside the DMZ be destroyed."

UNPROFOR suspect the same officer of shelling Sarajevo airport Tuesday to mark his displeasure.

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UN Helicopter Again Fired On Over Knin

AU1310162294 Paris AFP in English 1606 GMT 13 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Oct 13 (AFP)—For the second time in 24 hours a United Nations helicopter came under fire in Croatia from Serbian forces, a spokesman for the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) said in Zagreb on Thursday.

The news coincided with the announcement that the two co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference on ex-Yugoslavia, Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, were due in Zagreb on Thursday afternoon for "a routine visit" to see the head of UNPROFOR in ex-Yugoslavia, Yasushi Akashi.

The attack on the helicopter, by Serb forces using light weapons, took place on Wednesday at 1215 GMT near Knin, a stronghold of the Serbs of Krajina (the self-proclaimed statelet occupying a quarter of the territory of Croatia), UNPROFOR spokesman Michael Williams said.

On Tuesday another UN helicopter came under fire at a camp for Bosnian refugees near Karlovac, 50 kilometres (30 miles) south west of Zagreb. The Serbs were also blamed for that attack and a protest had been lodged with them, Williams said. In neither incident was anyone hurt or any damage done.

The UNPROFOR spokesman said that the visit to Zagreb by Owen and Stoltenberg was one of a series that took place about every six weeks so they could meet Akashi. They are to see Croatian Prime Minister Franjo Tudjman later in the day, according to the president's office.

Defense, Security Council Members Appointed

LD1310134494 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 13 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] On the basis of Article 100, Paragraph Two, and Article 106 of the Constitution of the Croatian Republic, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman has passed a decision on the appointment of members of the Presidential Defense and National Security Council, which comes into effect on 18 October this year.

The following have been appointed members of the Presidential Defense and National Security Council: Nedjelko Mihanovic, speaker of the assembly's Chamber of Deputies; Prime Minister Nikica Valentic; Hrvoje Sarinic, head of the president's office; Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister; Jure Radic, deputy prime minister and minister of reconstruction and development; chief economic adviser Franjo Greguric; Pero Jurkovic, governor of the National Bank of Croatia; Mrs. Katica Ivanisevic, speaker of the assembly's Chamber of Counties; Zarko Domljan and Vladimir Seks, deputy speakers of the Chamber of Deputies; Ivan Aralica, deputy speaker of the Chamber of Counties; Deputy Prime Ministers Borislav Skegro and Ivica Kostovic; Krunislav Olujic, head of the National Security Department; Defense Minister Gojko Susak; Interior Minister Ivan Jarnjak; Finance Minister Bozo Prka; General Janko Bobetko, chief of the general staff of the Croatian Army Corps; Luka Bebic, chairman of the assembly's Committee for Internal Affairs and National Security; Miroslav Tudjman, director of the Croatian Information Service; and Major General Zvonimir Cervenko, head of the president's military office—we read in the statement from the president's office.

Granic: UNPA Reintegration Plan Expected Soon

LD1310182294 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 13 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister, has submitted a report to the Chamber of Counties in connection with the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 947. The Chamber of Representatives resumed its session with a discussion on a number of proposed bills, but the session was suspended an hour ago due to the lack of a quorum. Kreso Zadravec and Jasenka Dudic report: [passage omitted]

[Zadravec] We insist on linking the lifting of the sanctions against the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] with the mutual recognition of all newly-created states on former Yugoslav soil, for which we have the support of major international parties. In two months' time at the latest, Croatia expects to have an effective plan with precise deadlines for the reintegration of Croatia's occupied areas [UN Protected Areas—UNPA], on the basis of the Croatian Constitution, the constitutional law on the rights of national communities and minorities, and Tudjman's peace initiatives, Granic said. Given the internal division in the Contact Group, Granic warned that even the very idea of forming any kind of a federation or a confederation would be unacceptable for Croatia. He added:

[Begin Granic recording] The reason I say this is because—if the Contact Group's plan does not come in time, or if there are any problems about our fundamental stands—the Republic of Croatia would quite certainly not accept this and the decisions of the Croatian Assembly would come into effect. [end recording]

[Zadravec] Granic also dwelled on the Washington Agreements, emphasizing the importance Croatia attached to them and on the support he was given during his visit to Kuwait and the UAE.

During the discussion deputies were adamant in their stand that—if Croatia's demands were not met by 10 January 1994—it should be understood that UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Force] mandate would automatically cease and that the government, the Croatian Army, and the police, as well as those involved in the economy, must have a clear picture about what to do after this deadline. [passage omitted]

Tudjman Receives Owen, Stoltenberg

LD1310193794 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 13 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, this evening received international mediators Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg. The

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meeting is attended by Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Mate Granic, head of the President's Office, Hrvoje Sarinic, head of the National Security Department, Krunislav Olujic, and presidential adviser for internal affairs Ivic Pasalic.

Owen: Government, Serbs Should Discuss Economy

LD1310215594 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 13 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] President Tudjman discussed the reintegration of the Croatian occupied areas and a global solution for this part of Europe with international peace mediators David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg this evening. The talks were also attended by Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister, Hrvoje Sarinic, the head of the president's office, Krunislav Olujic, the head of the Office for National Security, and Ivic Pasalic, the president's adviser. The international mediators were accompanied by Ambassador Kai Eide. Tihomir Vinkovic has a report.

[Vinkovic] We discussed with President Tudjman the need for and methods of finding a workable solution for Croatia, Lord Owen said after the talks and added:

[Begin Owen recording in English, fading to Serbo-Croatian report] We went over the important and familiar ground of how to make progress in solving the economic issues, on which the Croatian Government and the Serbs in Croatia should start holding talks as soon as possible. They should then move on to solving political issues. The plan of the so-called Zagreb four on the problem of the UN Protected Areas has not been finished yet, and when it is completed, both the Croatian Government and the Croatian Serbs will be consulted. In the meantime, I repeat, they should start solving economic problems. I think that everyone agrees that the problem of Croatia should be discussed at the same high level as the problem of Bosnia. A global view of the problem should be taken, after which talks should be held, but not in the take-it-or-leave-it style. The negotiations should be held in the framework of the conference on the former Yugoslavia with the participation of the governments of certain important countries, Lord Owen said, and added that he and Stoltenberg were going to Belgrade tomorrow. [end recording]

Mikelic Denies 'Secret' Negotiations in Graz

AU1410103194 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 13 Oct 94 p 24

[BETA-attributed report: "There Have Been No Secret Negotiations in Graz"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Borislav Mikelic, prime minister of the republic of Serbian Krajina, has categorically denied the information broadcast yesterday by Sarajevo Radio that he met in secret with the representatives of the Croatian authorities in Graz and conducted negotiations with them without the knowledge of President Milan Martic.

Sarajevo Radio yesterday carried a report by its correspondent in Zagreb, saying that Mikelic had traveled to Graz with the knowledge of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, which had made Krajina President Martic "furious."

Commentary Views Refugee Situation in Bosnia

AU1310124294 Split NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 7 Oct 94 p 9

[Commentary by Blanka Magas: "Who Is Stopping the Return of the Croats?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The future of the Bosniak-Croat Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina depends primarily on the return of refugees and displaced persons. Only if conditions are created for the native population to return to their homes in numbers as great as possible, with guarantees of their personal safety and that of their property, and if, with the support of the local authorities, they are provided with the possibility of ethnic organization and management—both Croats on the Muslim side and vice versa—can there be talk of a successful start to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation.

Acknowledging the facts concerning the present situation, the solution of the problem has not started yet, and it does not seem that it will unless stronger and more effective pressure is applied to the representatives of the authorities on both sides.

The most complex and difficult situation is that in central Bosnia, where there has been the greatest exodus of the native population, and abandoned houses have been taken over by refugees from other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina ethnically cleansed by the Serbs from territories that they control. This expelled population is mainly Muslim, and there are also a great number of Muslim settlers from Sandzak in Serbia and Montenegro, who have been moving to the territory controlled by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army under the constant pressure of the Serbian and Montenegrin authorities, and making the problems in Bosnia even greater. The present fact that the expelled are driving their hosts to seek refuge only multiplies the number of the unfortunate, and makes the chain of refugees, the end of which is not in sight, even longer.

Although there is no more fighting in central Bosnia, the basic territory of the future federation, and although there is greater security and greater mobility, with bus connections established between all the major towns, the shops full of various goods, and even the Croatian press available in Travnik and Zenica, the exodus has not stopped—indeed, it has increased. Croats are moving out the most—since the signing of the Washington Agreement over 7,000 people have left Zenica alone, 1,000 Travnik, and about 1,500 from Bugojno. The Muslim authorities in these areas do not allow the return of the Croatian refugees without reciprocity in terms of the return of Muslim refugees to Croat-controlled areas. Certain local potentates are even insisting on numerical reciprocity, and if this way of thinking prevails, then the prospects of the Croats returning

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to central Bosnia is not too bright, as there are over three times more of them than expelled Muslims.

Considering the complexity of the refugee issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the example of 15 municipalities in central Bosnia that are now under the control of Croatian and Bosniak authorities has been taken. They should be the basis of the future federation. According to the 1991 census, in these 15 central Bosnian municipalities (Breza, Bugojno, Busovaca, Fojnica, Gornji Vakuf, Kakanj, Kiseljak, Kresevo, Novi Travnik, Prozor, Travnik, Vares, Visoko, Vitez, and Zenica) there were living 462,505 people, of which there were 173,698 Croats (37.6 percent) and 288,807 Muslims (62.4 percent). This does not include the Serbs. According to the information available to the humanitarian and religious organizations, about 130,000 people have been expelled or have moved out of these areas under various pressures. Of those, 95,000 are Croats (54.7 percent of the population) and about 35,000 are Muslims (12 percent of the population). In relation to the number of the expelled, the Croats make up 73 percent, and the Muslims 27 percent.

It can be concluded from this information that total ethnic cleansing has taken place in certain areas in central Bosnia. In terms of the expulsion of the Croats, Fojnica is in first place with 97.9 percent, followed by Bugojno (90.8 percent), then Kakanj (90.2 percent), Vares (89 percent), and Travnik (88.4 percent).

In terms of Muslims being expelled, Kiseljak has the highest percentage (91.4 percent), followed by Prozor (90.6 percent), Kresevo (65.5 percent), Busovaca (64.8 percent), and Vitez (56.7 percent).

It is important to note that parts of Busovaca, Novi Travnik, and Vitez, as well as the center of Vitez, are controlled by the Bosnia- Herzegovina Army, and the municipalities from which the Croatian population has vanished are under the almost complete control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

Of these 15 municipalities, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army has full control in eight (Breza, Bugojno, Fojnica, Kakanj, Travnik, Vares, Visoko, and Zenica), and partial control—in that the territories are militarily divided—in four (Busovaca, Gornji Vakuf, Novi Travnik, and Vitez). The Croats have full control only of Kiseljak, Kresevo, and Prozor.

This is important to point out in view of the issue of the reciprocity of the return of the expelled populations. The Bosniak-Muslim side is in a much more favorable position in these areas, because it controls the greatest part of the territory, as well as because it has lost a much smaller number of the native population. It is supposed that even in the municipalities from which the Muslims moved out (Vitez, Novi Travnik, and Gornji Vakuf) the majority of the population remained in the same municipality, but crossed over to the territory controlled by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. A great burden on the Bosniak side is certainly the Muslims expelled from the territory that is now under Serbian control, but their problem has to be resolved outside the current issue of the return of the native population.

The atmosphere on the ground, regarding the return of those expelled, is different with the local population and the population that has moved in. The native Muslims in Travnik and Bugojno, for instance, sincerely wish that their neighboring Croats would return. The local Muslims in Zenica are worried about the increasing number of Croats moving out. The Muslim refugees living in Croats' houses oppose the return of the Croats mainly because they are worried about what will happen to them, since they cannot return to their homes, which have been occupied by the Serbs. There have also been extremist statements, such as "the Croats have nothing to do with this place any more!" but the dominant element are the problems of existing. The return of expelled Muslims to the areas under Croatian control is also commented on in different ways. The Croatian refugees accommodated in Muslim houses can hardly wait for the agreement on return, as they will then also be able to return to their homes, while the local population, save for a small number of extremists, would mind not at all if their former neighbors returned.

According to one journalist, the ground is no obstacle to the return of the expelled, although there will certainly be some individual resistance, regardless of the extent to which the authorities on both sides emphasize this. The question is whether there is a genuine wish for this to happen, especially on the Bosniak side, which should accept three times the number of Croats to the areas that it currently controls than that of Muslims who should return to the Croat-controlled areas. For the time being, though, as far as the authorities are concerned, everything is deadlocked.

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Serbia

Milosevic Receives Owen, Stoltenberg in Belgrade

LD1410153494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1440 GMT 14 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 14 Oct (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic received Thorvald Stoltenberg and David Owen, the cochairmen of the Geneva conference, who arrived in Belgrade today.

The president's office announced that during lengthy and frank talks they exchanged detailed opinions on current issues in the search for a political solution to the Yugoslav crisis. It was particularly stressed that the process of lifting the sanctions against the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] should be speeded up in the interest of the peace process, which is the most reliable way toward an overall normalization of relations in the territory of former Yugoslavia and the strengthening of the region's stability.

Serbia will continue, as before, to contribute to the maximum to the negotiating process, firmly believing that peace is the greatest interest of all peoples living in the territory of former Yugoslavia, and that their legitimate interests and rights can be permanently protected only in peacetime, the statement says.

Montenegro

Pljevlja Nuclear Station Closed After Accident

LD1310103694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0132 GMT 13 Oct 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Pljevlja, 13 Oct (TANJUG)—The dismantling of a generator is in progress following a big accident at the Pljevlja thermoelectric power station, which occurred on 9 October.

The degree of damage to the generator, the transformer unit, and the turbines will be established by the end of the week. [passage omitted] Damage to the generator's stator and rotor is visible and it is certain that huge damage has been caused.

It is still not known how long the Pljevlja thermoelectric power station, which used to produce about 4 million kilowatt hours of electricity daily, will be out of action. [passage omitted]

Kosovo

'Unprecedented Terror Against Albanians' Decried

AU1310160294 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT No 463 in English 12 Oct 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Joining a protest gathering last week in Prishtina, calling for the release of Albanian political prisoners following the sentencing of Mr. Ukshin Hoti, university teacher and chairman of the UNIKOMB [Party of National Unity], Academician Gazmend Zajmi urged Serbian authorities to put to an end the unprecedented terror against the Albanians in Kosova.

Speaking at the protest gathering, Dr. Zajmi said there was no human or moral ground for condemning people who speak out for their rights. "If people in Belgrade and Serbia were to be imprisoned for expression of their political opinions in favor of Serbian national union, then for the entire political elite and structure of Serbia there would barely be enough room in Serbian prisons," Dr. Zajmi said, speaking on the absurdity of charges against Albanians.

For quite some years now Kosova has been turned into a true laboratory of judicial miscarriages. The recent case against the University professor, Mr. Ukshin Hoti, is something quite unique, at least from the aspect of elementary logic and moral reasoning, Dr. Zajmi said.

"In the case of the imprisonment of the political opinion in Kosova one does not deal only with an undisputable lack of imagination by the Serbian regime for the pain it causes to another nation, but first of all with unchecked behavior resulting from their fear of losing something which they have been keeping by force, unjustly, and against the will of the people of Kosova expressed in a referendum," Academician Zajmi concluded, adding that the Serbian regime is wrong in believing that they can suppress democratic opinion and political action of Albanians for self-determination and equality by using prisons and repression.

'Tide of Strikes' Spreads Through Kosmet

AU1310153694 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Oct 94 p 4

[Report by R. Barjaktarevic: "Right To Work, Not Charity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Pristina—A tide of strikes is spreading through Kosmet [Kosovo and Metohija] these days, and is threatening to disrupt the already negative trend in production. The number of workers that have been on strike for days in some companies, and for weeks in others, exceeds 2,000. At the moment a dozen large companies are on strike in Kosmet, among them butchers from the Gnjilane slaughterhouse, merchants from Pec, chemists from Mitrovica, workers in the Urosevac wood industry, workers in the Podujevo communal services, and others.

In letters sent to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic—several were sent from Pristina to Belgrade yesterday—the workers were not asking for charity from the state or the president, but rather for the right for work to be provided for them by the Serbian Government and its ministries. They say in Kosmet that they no longer know whom to address, and in most companies they do not even know who the owners are.

We asked Momir Popovic, chairman of the Regional Council of the Association of Independent Trade Unions of Kosmet, why Kosmet workers where on mass strikes these days.

"Strikes in Kosmet are a normal occurrence. Over 10 large companies, with over 300 workers, are publicly and officially on strike at the moment, while some have gone on an

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unannounced strike since no one has offered them any help so far. The strikes in Kosmet are the result of an unprincipled employment policy, of the transformation process not being carried out, and of undetermined relations between trade unions and employers," Popovic said.

The Kosmet trade union has been warning the government and its ministries of the negative occurrences in the companies and institutions, but nobody has yet undertaken any concrete measures against those abusing the system.

The trade unions and the workers have been warning about the thefts and other forms of criminal activities by certain managers. However, instead of being called to answer for their activities, these individuals have been rewarded with promotions.

As things stand now, the employers are incapable of creating the conditions for getting production going or offering realistic programs, but—according to the trade union—a number of them have been involved in private businesses, without giving much thought to the companies or the workers. Because of that, the workers are demanding the dismissal of their immediate managers. The trouble is that the managers are protected by those who appointed them, that is, by those who are still in charge of the employment services.

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